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Abstract: 
To investigate whether making performance predictions affects prospective memory (PM) 
processing, we asked one group of participants to predict their performance in a PM task 
embedded in an ongoing task and compared their performance with a control group that made no 
predictions. A third group gave not only PM predictions but also ongoing-task predictions. 
Exclusive PM predictions resulted in slower ongoing-task responding both in a nonfocal 
(Experiment 1) and in a focal (Experiment 2) PM task. Only in the nonfocal task was the 
additional slowing accompanied by improved PM performance. Even in the nonfocal task, 
however, was the correlation between ongoing-task speed and PM performance reduced after 
predictions, suggesting that the slowing was not completely functional for PM. Prediction-
induced changes could be avoided by asking participants to additionally predict their 
performance in the ongoing task. In sum, the present findings substantiate a role of metamemory 
for attention-allocation strategies of PM. 
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cognition | memory | psychology 
Article: 
1. Introduction 
Event-based prospective memory (PM) refers to the ability to remember to perform an intended 
action in response to a target event such as remembering to buy medicine on the way home 
(Einstein & McDaniel, 1990). Current theorizing suggests two different cognitive routes to 
successful intention fulfillment: resource-demanding attentional monitoring for the appropriate 
moment of intention fulfillment and rather automatic (i.e., spontaneous) retrieval of the intention 
(Einstein and McDaniel, 2010 and McDaniel and Einstein, 2007). Research has yielded mixed 
findings regarding people’s engagement of attentional resources for PM intentions (Einstein and 
McDaniel, 2010 and Smith, 2010). In the present research, we examined metamemory influences 
on attentional monitoring by examining how making performance predictions within PM task 
settings may alter the allocation of attention to a PM intention as well as its functionality for 
intention fulfillment. 
1.1. Assessing attentional monitoring of prospective memory 
In the Einstein–McDaniel paradigm of PM (1990), participants have to perform an ongoing 
experimental task and, additionally, to prospectively remember to respond to specific PM-target 
stimuli within the ongoing task with a special key. This task setting mimics the common PM 
situation of remembering to do something at a future moment while performing other ongoing 
activities. To the extent that PM performance (i.e., pressing the special key in response to the PM 
targets) relies on attentional monitoring and thus requires cognitive resources, the PM intention 
should interfere with the ongoing task (Smith, 2003 and Smith, 2010). Indeed, the addition of a 
PM intention has been shown to slow ongoing task performance (Hicks et al., 2005, Marsh et al., 
2003, Scullin et al., 2010a and Smith, 2003). Furthermore, PM performance has been shown to 
vary with the demands of the ongoing task (Marsh, Hancock, & Hicks, 2002), demonstrating that 
both tasks draw on the same limited attentional resources. The interrelation between the PM task 
and the ongoing task is quite strong for nonfocal PM targets, whose processing imposes 
attentional demands in addition to the ongoing task demands. The interrelation is weaker, 
however, for focal PM targets, which require little attentional monitoring (Scullin, McDaniel, 
Shelton, & Lee, 2010; see also Einstein & McDaniel, 2005, for a review of focality effects). A 
target can be considered focal when the processing of the ongoing task encourages processing (1) 
of the PM target, usually referred to as task- or transfer-appropriate processing (cf. Marsh et al., 
2000, Maylor, 1996, Meier and Graf, 2000 and Meiser and Schult, 2008), and, especially, (2) of 
those features of the PM target that were encoded as relevant for the PM intention during 
intention formation (McDaniel & Einstein, 2007; see also McBride & Abney, 2012, for a 
comparison of task-appropriate and focal processing of PM). To illustrate, when driving home, 
the pharmacy sign we encounter on our usual way home can serve as a focal target because the 
sign has probably been encoded as relevant to the intention to buy medicine at the pharmacy. 
Further, there is a processing overlap between the ongoing activity of driving the car and 
encountering the sign, because while driving we must attend to road signs anyways. If the 
pharmacy requires a detour or is inside a mall, however, one would not spontaneously encounter 
the intention-relevant sign. Thus, attention has to be devoted to not miss the correct turn (i.e., a 
nonfocal cue; see Einstein & McDaniel, 2008, for similar everyday examples). 
 
Although it is well demonstrated that the engagement in monitoring for PM targets depends on 
the PM task demands, like the cues’ focality for example, there is evidence that other factors can 
also influence attention allocation. If the importance of the PM intention relative to the ongoing 
task is stressed/de-stressed, for instance, monitoring increases/decreases (Marsh et al., 2005 and 
Smith and Bayen, 2004). On the other hand, if participants imagine themselves performing the 
PM task during intention formation (i.e., mental simulation of the PM-task, Brewer & Marsh, 
2010), PM performance increases while attentional monitoring remains unaffected or even 
decreases (Brewer et al., 2011, McFarland and Glisky, 2012, Meiser and Rummel, 2012 and 
Rummel et al., 2012). 
 
1.2. Prospective memory predictions and attentional monitoring 
Recently, PM researchers have started to investigate people’s insight into their own PM abilities 
by asking them to predict their PM performance (e.g., Meeks, Hicks, & Marsh, 2007). 
Performance predictions have been used in various memory domains to assess people’s 
metamemory (Hertzog & Hultsch, 2000). Memory-performance predictions allow direct 
investigation of how accurately individuals anticipate their memory performance (e.g., Nelson & 
Dunlosky, 1991) and have been found to relate to memory strategies (cf. Hertzog et al., 2007 and 
Kuhlmann and Touron, 2011). More globally, making performance predictions improves 
retrospective memory performance (Kelemen and Weaver, 1997 and Spellman and Bjork, 1992). 
 
Regarding the accuracy of PM predictions, people generally underestimate their PM performance 
(Knight et al., 2005, Meeks et al., 2007 and Schnitzspahn et al., 2011; but see Devolder, 
Brigham, & Pressley, 1990). Meeks et al. (2007), however, found moderate but significant 
correlations between PM predictions and actual PM performance, implying that participants had 
at least some insight in their own PM performance (see also Schnitzspahn et al., 2011). 
Surprisingly, Meeks et al. (2007) did not find significant correlations between ongoing-task 
response speed and PM performance, although PM performance in this study should have 
depended on attentional monitoring as the PM targets were nonfocal.1 That is, requiring 
participants to make PM performance predictions appears to have altered attentional monitoring 
processes, which are usually related to nonfocal PM performance in studies not assessing 
predictions. 
 
Despite its repeated use, prior research has not sufficiently considered global effects of making 
PM predictions on the allocation of attention to a PM task by comparing a condition making PM 
predictions to an appropriate no-prediction control condition. Given that performance predictions 
have reactive effects on RM performance, we argue that making PM predictions can also 
reactively affect PM performance and the processes engaged in favor of the PM task (see Meier, 
von Wartburg, Matter, Rothen, & Reber, 2011, for a similar argument). Such reactive effects 
from PM predictions would not only complicate the interpretation of PM prediction accuracy but 
also imply that metamemory plays a critical role for attention allocation strategies in PM (cf. 
Einstein & McDaniel, 2008). 
 
The present study thus aims first to demonstrate that making PM predictions can reactively affect 
attentional PM processing. Additionally, we suggest a design-based modification of prediction 
assessment that controls for attentional changes and thus for at least some of the reactive effects 
of PM predictions. Finally, we argue that examining reactive effects may help to clarify the 
puzzling null-correlations between PM and ongoing-task performances after predictions (cf. 
Meeks et al., 2007), as reactive additional monitoring may not be completely functional for PM 
performance and as such predictions may incite a strategic approach which is not maximally 
efficient. 
 
To our knowledge, the only previous investigation of reactive effects from PM predictions is a 
study by Meier et al. (2011). These authors argued that making PM predictions might facilitate 
processing of the PM target. In particular, they suggested that performance predictions might 
encourage participants to mentally simulate (cf. Brewer & Marsh, 2010) the PM task in order to 
anticipate their performance, which would cause the PM targets to pop-up in the ongoing-task 
environment and thus allow participants to rely more on spontaneous retrieval and less on 
attentional monitoring for their PM performance. Accordingly, Meier and colleagues found 
performance improvements after making PM predictions with a nonfocal PM task. In addition, 
they asked those participants who performed the PM task correctly whether they remembered the 
intention (a) because they were searching for the target or (b) because the target popped into their 
mind. Results showed that participants who fulfilled the PM task and had made a PM prediction 
did not report more PM target pop-up experiences but rather more searching for the PM targets 
than participants who fulfilled the PM task but had not made predictions. Thus, according to the 
self-reports, participants seemed to consciously engage more strategic processing after PM 
predictions rather than relying more on a pop-up experience. Notably, self-reports in the study by 
Meier et al. were conditional on the successful performance of the PM task and assessed after 
PM response execution. Thus, successful performance of the PM task might have affected self-
reports. Furthermore, Meier and colleagues did not use a speeded ongoing task. Therefore, it is 
unclear whether the PM prediction-induced changes in retrospectively reported searching 
translate into attentional monitoring as it is commonly measured, by objective performance 
assessed online (i.e., slowed responding in an ongoing task). Further, in Meier et al.’s study, 
participants in one condition completed six questions anticipating PM performance after 
intention formation and PM performance in this condition was compared to a control condition 
that did not complete any questions regarding the PM task. Thus, the participants in the PM-
prediction condition had several additional opportunities to rehearse the intention. This 
manipulation is likely to encourage monitoring by stressing the importance of the PM task over 
the ongoing task as well as to facilitate spontaneous retrieval by allowing participants to rehearse 
(and potentially to mentally simulate, cf. Meier et al., 2011), the intention. Therefore, their 
manipulation does not allow for differentiating between PM-performance benefits from 
increased attentional monitoring versus from facilitated spontaneous retrieval or a combination 
of both. 
 
1.3. The present study 
To better understand the reactive effects of PM predictions, we used a standard PM paradigm 
with a speeded ongoing task (OT) that has been used to assess attentional monitoring in terms of 
PM-induced slowing to the OT (Einstein et al., 2005, Hicks et al., 2005, Marsh et al., 2003, 
Meeks et al., 2007, Scullin et al., 2009 and Smith, 2003). One group of participants predicted 
their PM performance and another (control) group made no predictions. Comparing these two 
groups should result in replication of the previous finding regarding reactive effects of PM 
predictions on PM performance (Meier et al., 2011). Extending previous research, the use of a 
speeded OT allows for an investigation of whether and how PM predictions change attentional 
PM processing. For better comparability with previous findings by Meeks et al. (2007), 
participants in the present study predicted their PM-performance only once. 
 
Importantly, we added a third condition of participants who predicted their PM performance but 
also predicted their OT performance. Importantly, this PM/OT-prediction condition had identical 
opportunities to rehearse the intention during encoding as participants in the PM-prediction 
condition, who only predicted their PM performance. Thus, both prediction groups should have 
encoded the PM intention equally well, leading to similar levels of spontaneous retrieval. 
Notably, unlike in the PM-prediction condition, the importance of the PM task (relative to the 
OT) was not particularly stressed in the PM/OT-prediction condition. This manipulation 
therefore allows to disentangle whether reactive effects from predictions on PM performance are 
due to monitoring effects (occurring in the PM-prediction condition only resulting from stressing 
the PM task over the OT) versus spontaneous retrieval effects (occurring in both the PM-
prediction and PM/OT-prediction conditions resulting from better PM encoding due to additional 
intention rehearsal). 
 
As focality of PM-target events influences the engagement of spontaneous retrieval processes, 
PM predictions may affect processing in nonfocal and focal PM tasks differently. Thus, we 
investigated the effects of PM predictions on PM processing under nonfocal (Experiment 1) and 
focal (Experiment 2) PM task conditions. 
 
To more clearly interpret the expected prediction-induced effects, in the present study we applied 
the drift diffusion model (e.g., Ratcliff, 1978) to the OT data. Generally, this model estimates 
specific cognitive processes contributing to performance, based on accuracy and response speed 
data from two-choice decision tasks (Ratcliff, Gomez, & McKoon, 2004). Therefore, the model 
integrates two behavioral measures which are usually in a compensatory relationship (i.e., 
accuracy and response speed) into psychologically meaningful process parameters (Ratcliff et 
al., 2004). For the present analyses, we focused on the three core parameters of the drift diffusion 
model, namely the drift rate (parameter v), the response criterion (parameter a), and a non-
decisional component (parameter t0) which have been shown to underlie lexical-decision 
performance. The drift rate characterizes how efficiently information about the stimulus 
regarding the required decision (e.g., word or nonword) is processed and is selectively influenced 
by manipulations of factual task demands in a lexical decision task (e.g., using high versus low 
frequency words; Ratcliff et al., 2004). The response criterion, on the other hand, characterizes 
how conservative participants are in making their decision with conservative participants 
requiring more evidence before making a response; this process is influenced by manipulating 
response tendencies in a lexical decision task (e.g., via speed versus accuracy instructions; 
Wagenmakers, Ratcliff, Gomez, & McKoon, 2008). Last, the non-decisional component captures 
time spent for processing unrelated to the decision such as perception of the target stimulus or 
execution of the response but also stimulus encoding time (Voss, Voss, & Klauer, 2010). Past 
applications of the drift diffusion model to PM data with a lexical-decision task as OT have 
found variations of factual PM task demands to be reflected by changes in the drift rate (i.e., the 
parameter v) and sometimes in the non-decisional (t0) component ( Boywitt and Rummel, 2012 
and Horn et al., 2011). This implies that these parameters represent the (dis)engagement in 
additional resource-demanding PM processing (e.g., monitoring of a different quality, cf. 
Albinski, Sedek, & Kliegel, 2012). Providing bogus information that the PM target is unlikely to 
occur (while holding factual task demands constant), on the other hand, has been shown to result 
in less cautious OT responding as reflected by a less conservative response criterion (i.e., the 
parameter a) of the drift diffusion model (Boywitt & Rummel, 2012, Experiment 1). Boywitt and 
Rummel conclude that subjective expectations about PM-task demands are selectively reflected 
by the parameter a. Therefore, to the extent that making PM predictions increases the perceived 
importance of the PM task relative to the OT, we would expect response speed decrements to be 
mirrored by a more conservative response criterion. To the extent that the factual processing 
demands of the PM task are comparable with and without PM predictions, the other drift 
diffusion parameters should remain largely unaffected by the present manipulation. 
 
2. Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1, we tested whether making PM predictions changes processing in a nonfocal 
PM task by asking one group of participants to predict their PM performance (i.e., PM-prediction 
condition) and comparing their performance to a no-prediction control condition. A third group 
(i.e., PM/OT-prediction condition) made OT performance predictions in addition to the PM 
predictions to test whether additional OT predictions counteract attentional changes expected 
with exclusive PM predictions. Importantly, participants in the PM/OT-prediction and the PM-
prediction conditions had identical opportunities to rehearse the PM intention when making the 
PM prediction, thus PM-performance differences between these two conditions should only 
reflect differences in the engagement of attentional monitoring. 
 
2.1. Method 
2.1.1. Participants and design 
A total of 145 undergraduates at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro who all 
indicated English as their first language participated for course credit. Six participants who did 
not recall the PM task at the end of the experiment were excluded from the analyses. As PM has 
been show to decline with age (Kliegel, Jäger, & Phillips, 2008), we a priori confined our sample 
to young adults (aged 18–35). Consequently, one tested participant who was 52-year old was 
also excluded from the analyses, even though including this participant would not have changed 
the pattern of results. The final sample consisted of 138 participants (18–33 years, M = 18.95). 
Participants were randomly assigned to the three experimental conditions (i.e., PM-prediction, 
PM/OT-prediction, and no-prediction control) with n = 46 in each condition. As we expected a 
null effect in terms of identical OT performance in the PM/OT-prediction and the no-prediction 
control condition, the sample-size was chosen on the basis of an a priori power analysis using the 
software G∗Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). The achieved power to reveal at 
least a medium-sized  difference between the two conditions in a planned-comparison 
analysis was 1 − β = .82. 
 
2.1.2. Procedure and materials 
After signing a consent form, participants received instructions for the lexical-decision task (i.e., 
classifying letter strings as words or nonwords). This task was introduced as a word judgment 
task. Participants were instructed to respond by pressing the keys “F” for nonwords and “J” for 
words (labeled “N” and “Y,” respectively). Participants were ask to use their index fingers for 
the lexical decisions and were encouraged to be fast and accurate. After completing 20 practice 
trials (10 words, 10 nonwords), participants received the additional PM instruction to press the 
“/” key (no finger specified) instead of the “Y” key whenever they saw a member of the animal 
category in the lexical decision task. To ensure that they understood the instructions, participants 
repeated them in their own words to the experimenter. 
 
Participants in the two prediction conditions (but not in the control condition) then predicted 
their task performance. In the PM-prediction condition, participants answered the question 
“What percentage of the animal words do you think you will detect during the word judgment 
task?” using a scale from 0% to 100% (Meeks et al., 2007). In the PM/OT-prediction condition, 
participants answered two additional questions, that is, “What percentage of the strings of letters 
do you think you will correctly judge as words or nonwords?” (again, using a scale from 0% to 
100%) and “How fast do you think you can perform the word judgment task?” (using a scale 
from 0 = much slower than other participants to 100 = much faster than other participants).2 
 
Next, all participants completed a figural reasoning task for 5 min to prevent rehearsing the PM 
intention. Then, participants performed 300 lexical-decision trials for which 146 words of 
medium frequency and 146 nonwords were derived from an online database controlling for 
length (Balota et al., 2007). For the additional PM task, eight animal names (i.e., “sheep,” 
“moose,” “zebra,” “rabbit,” “squirrel,” “giraffe,” “elephant,” and “goat,”) were selected as PM 
targets and presented at trials 60, 90, 130, 160, 200, 230, 260, and 295. These target words were 
matched to the OT words in frequency and length. On each trial, participants saw a fixation cross 
in the center of the screen of a random duration between 250 and 750 ms followed by a probe 
stimulus. The fixation-cross duration was varied to prevent participants from using the inter-
stimulus interval for an attentional break (cf. Smith, Hunt, McVay, & McConnell, 2007). After 
participants responded to the probe stimulus, a new fixation cross was presented after a blank 
screen of 500 ms. 
 
Upon completion of the lexical-decision task, participants indicated what special words they 
were supposed to respond to with which special key. As noted, only participants who could 
recall these instructions were included in the analyses. Finally, participants answered 
demographic questions and were debriefed. 
 
2.2. Results and discussion 
We set an alpha level of .05 for all analyses. 
 
2.2.1. Reactive effects of making predictions on OT performance 
Error rates and response times (RTs) in the ongoing lexical-decision task were both submitted to 
a one-way ANOVA with the between-subjects variable prediction condition (PM-prediction, 
PM/OT-prediction, No-prediction control) to assess whether making PM predictions affected OT 
performance (cf. Table 1). Error rates in the lexical-decision task were small (<.08, in all three 
conditions) and did not vary with conditions, F(2, 135) = 1.19, p = .305,  
Table 1. 
Means (standard errors) for performance and metacognitive measures in Experiment 1. 
 
PM prediction PM/OT prediction No prediction 
OT error rate .07 (.01) .08 (.01) .07 (.01) 
OT response times (ms) 780 (16) 708 (15) 742 (16) 
Response criterion (a) 1.47 (0.05) 1.32 (0.04) 1.38 (0.05) 
Drift rate (v) 2.26 (0.07) 2.53 (0.10) 2.41(0.09) 
Non-decisional component (t0) 0.50 (0.05) 0.50 (0.05) 0.50 (0.05) 
PM accuracy rate .50 (.04) .45 (.04) .38 (.04) 
PM prediction .74 (.03) .73 (.03) – 
Note: PM = prospective memory; OT = ongoing task. 
RT-analyses were confined to words in the lexical-decision task, because PM targets were words 
only and thus word RTs will better reflect any additional PM processing (cf. Hicks et al., 2005). 
The first four trials of the task as well as any trials including a PM target and the four trials 
following a PM target were excluded from the RT analyses to control for switch costs associated 
with these trials (cf. Smith & Bayen, 2004). RTs were trimmed such that values below 300 ms or 
2 standard deviations above the individual mean were excluded (cf. Einstein et al., 2005). The 
ANOVA for RTs revealed a significant main effect of prediction condition, F(2, 135) = 5.18, p = 
.007, . 3 We used two orthogonal planned contrasts rather than post hoc comparisons to 
follow up on the significant main effect, because they allow a more focused test of our 
hypotheses that attentional PM processing increased after exclusive PM predictions but not after 
combined PM and OT predictions. Additionally, planned contrasts achieve a higher statistical 
power (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1985), and as we expected a null-effect regarding the comparison 
between the PM/OT-prediction and the control condition a powerful test was warranted. The first 
contrast compared the PM-prediction condition with the control condition and the PM/OT-
prediction condition to test whether attentional monitoring increased after making exclusive PM 
predictions. In line with our hypothesis, this contrast revealed that RTs were significantly higher 
in the PM-prediction condition as compared to the other two conditions, t(135) = 2.83, p = .005, 
d = .50. The second contrast compared the control condition and the PM/OT condition to test for 
monitoring differences between these two conditions. With good statistical power, the second 
contrast did not yield significance, t(135) = 1.57, p = .119, d = .30. Thus, in line with our 
hypothesis, the OT slowing from exclusive PM predictions was significantly reduced to the level 
of a no-prediction control group by asking participants to additionally predict their OT 
performance. Notably, RTs in the PM/OT-prediction condition were numerically even faster than 
in the control condition. Thus, while the significant first contrast implies that exclusive PM 
predictions caused an additional allocation of attention to the PM intention, the non-significant 
second contrast demonstrates that there was no such additional allocation of attention when both 
PM and OT predictions were made. These results demonstrate that the additional OT predictions 
were effective in avoiding reactive effects of making PM predictions in terms of an additional 
allocation of attention to the PM intention. 
 
To more clearly interpret the prediction-induced slowing to the OT, we applied the drift diffusion 
model to the present data. As indicated when modeling lexical decisions with the drift diffusion 
model (Ratcliff et al., 2004 and Wagenmakers et al., 2008), we first controlled for aberrant RTs 
using the same trimming procedure and exclusion criteria for post-cue trials as before. Then, 
trimmed RTs and accuracy rates for words that were not PM targets were submitted to the drift 
diffusion model (cf. Boywitt & Rummel, 2012) using the software Fast-dm (Voss & Voss, 
2007). The upper threshold of the model was associated with a correct word classification, 
whereas the lower threshold was associated with an incorrect word classification (i.e., classifying 
a word as a nonword). The parameter z (i.e., the starting point of the diffusion process) was set to 
a/2 (cf. Boywitt & Rummel, 2012). Individual Kolmogorov–Smirnov goodness-of-fit tests were 
all non-significant, indicating that the drift diffusion model fit the present data (Voss & Voss, 
2008). Next, the three core parameters of the model as well as their inter-trial variability 
parameters were estimated. As these core parameters have been shown to reflect different 
attentional processes of PM ( Boywitt and Rummel, 2012 and Horn et al., 2011) we computed 
separate one-way ANOVAs with the between-subjects variable prediction condition (PM-
prediction, PM/OT-prediction, No-prediction control) for all three parameters (see Table 1). The 
ANOVAs did not yield significance for the non-decisional t0 parameter, F < 1, or the processing 
parameter v, F(2, 135) = 2.31, p = .103, . However, we found a marginally significant 
overall effect for the response-criterion parameter a, F(2, 135) = 2.53, p = .084, . As we 
aimed to further investigate the OT RT pattern described above with the drift diffusion modeling, 
we followed up on the marginal effect on the a parameter by computing the same two planned 
contrasts as for the OT RT analyses. Reflecting the RT results, the first contrast revealed that the 
a parameter was significantly higher in the PM-prediction condition as compared to the control 
condition and the PM/OT-prediction condition, t(135) = 2.07, p = .037, d = .36. With good 
statistical power, the second contrast comparing the control condition and the PM/OT condition 
did not yield significance, |t| < 1. This pattern of results suggests that the RT results reported 
above are due to individuals becoming more cautious in their response decisions for a given 
stimulus after making exclusive PM predictions. In line with previous interpretations of the a 
parameter as reflecting strategies of how a PM setting is approached (cf. Boywitt & Rummel, 
2012), this finding speaks in favor of an additional allocation of attention to the PM task after 
making exclusive PM predictions and further corroborates the interpretation that PM predictions 
changed attention allocation within the PM setting. 
 
2.2.2. Reactive effects of making predictions on PM performance 
Proportions of correct PM responses (i.e., pressing the “/” key to PM-target words) were used to 
assess PM performance. When applying a strict criterion by counting only immediate (but not 
late) “/”-key presses as correct PM responses, we found a marginally significant overall effect in 
a one-way ANOVA with the between-subjects variable prediction condition (PM-prediction, 
PM/OT-prediction, no-prediction control), F(2, 135) = 2.57, p = .080, . 4LSD 
comparisons showed that the proportion of immediate PM responses was significantly higher in 
the PM-prediction condition as compared to the no-prediction control condition, p = .025, which 
replicates previous findings by Meier et al. (2011). The PM/OT prediction did not differ 
significantly from either the PM-prediction or the control condition, both ps ⩾ .213. 
 
A central aim of Experiment 1 was to consider whether PM-performance improvements after PM 
predictions were due to increased attentional monitoring, facilitated spontaneous retrieval of the 
PM intention upon encountering a PM cue, or both. Despite their equal additional opportunities 
to rehearse the PM intention (and perhaps to engage in PM simulation), which should facilitate 
spontaneous retrieval, only the PM-prediction condition but not the PM/OT-prediction condition 
achieved a significantly higher PM performance than the no-prediction control condition. Given 
that the two prediction conditions differed significantly in the level of attentional monitoring but 
not in PM-performance level, it seems that increased attentional monitoring or the combination 
of increased monitoring and additional PM rehearsal was effective in improving PM 
performance. However, PM performance in the PM/OT-prediction condition was numerically 
higher than in the control condition and the statistical power of this comparison to reveal a small 
effect was only moderate, so we cannot rule out the possibility of an undetected (small) 
improvement due to additional PM rehearsal after making both PM and OT predictions. 
 
To investigate whether variations in OT response speed were related to PM performance, we 
correlated the proportion of correct PM responses with OT RTs separately for each condition. 
Scatter-plots for these correlations are provided in Fig. 1. These analyses revealed significant 
correlations in the control condition, r(46) = .44, p = .002, and in the PM/OT-prediction 
condition, r(46) = .49, p < .001, but not in the PM-prediction condition, r(46) = .10, p = .520. 
One could assume that attentional PM processing was at ceiling after making exclusive PM 
predictions, and the reduced correlation reflects experimentally reduced variability of RTs in this 
group. The Levene test for equality of variances showed, however, that RT variances in all three 
groups were comparable, F < 1. The variance in the PM-prediction condition was numerically 
even higher (12404.85) than in the PM/OT-prediction (9920.86) and the control condition 
(11622.61). Thus, the reduced correlation in the PM-prediction condition is unlikely to be a 
statistical artifact and rather indicates a dissociation of the OT response speed and PM 
performance after exclusive PM predictions. Hicks, Marsh and colleagues ( Hicks et al., 2005 
and Marsh et al., 2003) have reported such a dissociation for PM tasks of various difficulties. 
The present finding further suggests that even within the same PM task, the relation between OT 
RTs and PM performance is likely to vary as a function of intention instructions. Specifically, 
this pattern of results implies that the observed slowing in the PM-prediction condition (as 
compared to the PM/OT-prediction condition) did not completely translate into functional PM 
processing, and that this reactivity thereby did not incite an efficient strategic approach. This 
might explain why Meeks et al. (2007) did not find correlations between OT RTs and nonfocal 
PM performance in their study where all participants made exclusive PM predictions. 
Fig. 1.  Scatter-plots reflect the relationship between PM-accuracy rates (ranging from 0 to 1) 
and response times (RTs) to words (in ms) of Experiment 1. Separate plots are provided for (A) 
the control conditions where no predictions were made, (B) the PM-prediction condition where 
the performance in the PM task was predicted only, and (C) the PM/OT-prediction condition 
where both performances in the PM task and in the ongoing task were predicted. 
 
2.2.3. Accuracy of PM predictions 
To evaluate the absolute accuracy of PM predictions, we subtracted the factual proportion of 
correct PM responses from the predicted proportions and compared these differences against 0 in 
one-sample t-tests separately for the two prediction conditions. Results showed that participants 
expected their PM performance to be significantly higher than it actually was in both the PM-
prediction condition (M = .23, SE = .05), t(45) = 4.67, p < .001, and the PM/OT-prediction 
condition (M = .28, SE = .05), t(45) = 6.02, p < .001. As expected, the level of overestimation 
was comparable in both prediction groups, |t| < 1. Finding a general overestimation of the actual 
PM performance was unexpected as most other studies reported a PM-performance 
underestimation ( Knight et al., 2005, Meeks et al., 2007 and Schnitzspahn et al., 2011; but see 
also Devolder et al., 1990) and might stem from procedural differences between the tasks. We 
will discuss this finding further in Section 4. 
 
Furthermore, we did not find significant correlations between PM predictions and PM 
performance in the PM-prediction condition, r(46) = .19, p = .202, or the PM/OT-prediction 
condition, r(46) = .05, p = .768, suggesting that participants had little insight into their own PM 
performance before the task. 
 
3. Experiment 2 
Results of Experiment 1 provided original evidence that making PM predictions reactively 
changes attentional monitoring in a PM setting with nonfocal targets and that these reactive 
effects can be partly avoided by additionally asking participants to predict their OT performance. 
It remains an open question, however, whether attention allocation is similarly affected by 
making PM predictions in the case of focal targets. With focal PM targets, PM performance 
should rely more on spontaneous retrieval processes (Einstein & McDaniel, 2005). Although 
there is an ongoing debate of whether PM can succeed in the complete absence of attentional 
monitoring (Einstein and McDaniel, 2010 and Smith, 2010), all current theories of PM would 
agree that less monitoring is necessary to accomplish a PM task when the PM targets become 
more focal. Indeed, there is empirical evidence that a PM task with a single focal cue results in 
very high PM performance (i.e., 92% correct responses) while attentional monitoring is reduced 
as compared to nonfocal targets (Marsh et al., 2003). Given that focal PM performance is very 
high, one cannot necessarily expect that making PM predictions can further improve PM 
performance by either increased attentional monitoring or facilitated spontaneous retrieval (cf. 
Uttl, 2005). It is possible, however, that making PM predictions changes PM processing in a 
focal PM task, even if the generally high PM performance leaves no room for these processing 
changes to translate into a PM benefit. To test this assumption, we compared the same three 
experimental conditions (PM-prediction, PM/OT-prediction, and no-prediction condition) as in 
Experiment 1 but with a focal PM task. 
 
As the precise and reliable assessment of attentional monitoring in the case of focal targets is a 
critical issue in PM research (Einstein and McDaniel, 2010 and Smith, 2010), we followed 
Smith’s suggestion to control for inter-individual differences in response latencies by measuring 
lexical-decision response times in a baseline block where participants did not yet hold an 
intention. At the same time, we shortened the lexical-decision block with the embedded PM task 
accordingly to keep the length of Experiments 1 and 2 comparable. Importantly, we also kept the 
ratio of PM trials to OT trials constant between Experiments 1 and 2, because increasing the 
proportion of PM trials is likely to increase monitoring (Loft & Yeo, 2007, Experiment 3). Thus, 
four (instead of eight) PM trials were included in the experimental block of the lexical-decision 
task in Experiment 2. 
 
3.1. Method 
3.1.1. Participants and design 
A total of 138 undergraduates of the University of Mannheim, Germany (18–29 years, M = 
20.54) who all indicated German as their first language participated for course credit or monetary 
incentives. All participants correctly recalled the PM instructions at the end of the experiment. 
Participants were randomly assigned to a PM-prediction condition, a PM/OT-prediction 
condition, and a no-prediction control condition. Sample-size (n = 46 in each condition) was 
chosen in accordance with Experiment 1 to achieve comparable power. 
 
3.1.2. Procedure and materials 
The procedure was identical to Experiment 1 with the following exceptions. After receiving OT 
instructions and performing the practice trials, participants first performed 140 lexical-decisions 
trials before they received PM-task instructions to allow for a baseline measurement of lexical-
decision performance. The PM instruction was to press the “/” key instead of the “Y” key 
whenever they saw a specific word, which was randomly selected for each participant from a 
body of seven PM-target words. A single PM-target word should be rather focal in the context of 
a lexical-decision task as the exact word is encoded as intention-relevant and performing the OT 
already requires word processing (cf. Einstein & McDaniel, 2005). The German translations of 
the PM-target words from Experiment 1 were used in Experiment 2 as the focal targets. Only the 
word “squirrel” was dismissed because the German equivalent “Eichhörnchen” would have 
stood out from the OT stimuli due to its length. After receiving PM instructions and eventually 
making performance predictions (worded as in Experiment 1), participants performed another 
164 lexical-decision trials. The randomly selected PM-target word was presented at Trials 60, 90, 
130, and 160. 
 
Instructions from Experiment 1 and PM-target words were translated into German by a native 
speaker. For the lexical-decision task, 300 words were chosen from a German word-norm 
database (Hager & Hasselhorn, 1993) to serve as probes with the same selection criteria as in 
Experiment 1. Nonwords were created by swapping two syllables in half of the words. 
 
3.2. Results and discussion 
3.2.1. Reactive effects of making predictions on OT performance 
Error rates and RTs in the ongoing lexical decision task were both submitted to a 3 × 2 mixed 
ANOVA with the between-subjects variable of prediction condition (PM-prediction, PM/OT-
prediction, no-prediction control) and the within-subjects variable of block (PM-intention absent, 
PM-intention present) to assess whether making performance predictions affected OT 
performance (cf. Table 2). Error rates in the lexical decision task were small (<.07 in all 
conditions) and did not vary between conditions or blocks, all Fs < 1.5, all ps > .22. 
Table 2. 
Means (standard errors) for performance and metacognitive measures in Experiment 2. 
 
PM prediction 
 
PM/OT prediction 
 
No prediction 
 
 
PM intention 
absent 
PM intention 
present 
PM intention 
absent 
PM intention 
present 
PM intention 
absent 
PM intention 
present 
OT error rate .06 (.01) .05 (.01) .06 (.01) .06 (.01) .06 (.01) .07 (.01) 
OT response times 
(ms) 
668 (16) 740 (16) 653 (15) 695 (16) 647 (16) 690 (16) 
Response criterion 
(a) 
1.28 (0.04) 1.31 (0.04) 1.22 (0.04) 1.19 (0.04) 1.20 (0.04) 1.17 (0.04) 
Drift rate (v) 2.63 (0.09) 2.37 (0.08) 2.77 (0.09) 2.42 (0.08) 2.68 (0.09) 2.36 (0.08) 
Non-decisional 
component (t0) 
0.46 (0.01) 0.50 (0.01) 0.46 (0.01) 0.50 (0.01) 0.45 (0.01) 0.50 (0.01) 
 
PM prediction 
 
PM/OT prediction 
 
No prediction 
 
 
PM intention 
absent 
PM intention 
present 
PM intention 
absent 
PM intention 
present 
PM intention 
absent 
PM intention 
present 
PM accuracy rate .87 (.03) 
 
.85 (.03) 
 
.88 (.03) 
 
PM prediction .66 (.03) 
 
.69 (.03) 
 
– 
 
Note: PM = prospective memory; OT = ongoing task. 
RT-analyses were confined to words and trimmed as in Experiment 1. The ANOVA for RTs did 
not yield a main effect of prediction condition, F < 1.6, but a significant main effect of block, 
F(1, 135) = 138.75, p < .001, , with faster RTs in the absence of a PM intention (M = 
656 ms, SE = 9) than in the presence of a PM intention (M = 709 ms, SE = 9). Importantly, this 
main effect was qualified by a significant interaction with prediction condition, F(1, 135) = 4.91, 
p = .009, . RTs in the block without the PM-task did not vary with conditions, F < 1. 
Next, we computed difference scores by subtracting the mean RTs in the block without the PM-
task from the RTs in the block with the PM-task. These difference scores reflect PM-induced 
slowing controlling for a priori response-speed differences between participants. Thus this RT 
cost measure should be a more sensitive measure of attentional monitoring (cf. Smith, 2010). 
The ANOVA for RT-difference scores with the between-subjects factor condition became 
significant, F(2, 135) = 4.91, p = .009, . We followed up on this main effect using the 
same two planned contrasts as in Experiment 1 to test our hypothesis that attentional monitoring 
increases with exclusive PM predictions but not with PM and OT predictions with high statistical 
power (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1985). The planned contrast showed that RT-difference scores 
were significantly higher in the PM-prediction condition (M = 72 ms, SE = 8) as compared to the 
control condition (M = 43 ms, SE = 8) and the PM/OT-prediction condition (M = 42 ms, SE = 
8), t(135) = 3.13, p = .002, d = .51. At the same time, with good statistical power (1 − β = .84) to 
reveal a medium-sized effect, the PM/OT-prediction condition did not differ from the control 
condition, |t| < 1. These results match the finding from Experiment 1 that attentional monitoring 
is increased after making exclusive PM predictions. Furthermore, the results show that, as in 
Experiment 1, the prediction-induced slowing to the OT is avoided by asking participants to also 
predict their OT performance. 
 
Again, we applied the drift diffusion model to the trimmed word RT and accuracy data (see 
Table 2) to follow up on the significant RT results. Individual Kolmogorov–Smirnov goodness-
of-fit tests were all non-significant, indicating that the drift diffusion model fit the data. Next, we 
submitted each core parameter to an ANOVA with prediction condition (PM-prediction, PM/OT-
prediction, No-prediction control) and block (PM-intention absent, PM-intention present). The 
drift rate parameter v decreased with blocks, F(1, 135) = 47.45, p < .001, , 
demonstrating that OT processing was less efficient in the presence of a PM intention (M = 2.38, 
SE = 0.05) than in its absence (M = 2.70, SE = 0.05). The non-decisional t0 component increased 
with blocks, F(1, 135) = 142.40, p < .001, , implying that OT responding was slowed by 
a constant additive factor in the presence of a PM intention (M = 0.50, SE = 0.004) as compared 
to when the PM intention was absent (M = 0.46, SE = 0.004). This constant factor might reflect 
some additional checking for PM targets on each trial (Boywitt & Rummel, 2012). No other 
main effects or interactions reached significance for these two parameters, all Fs < 1. These 
results suggest that the presence of a PM intention resulted in the engagement of additional 
processing while performing the OT replicating Horn et al. (2011). As the main purpose of the 
block without a PM intention was to reduce error variance in terms of a priori differences in 
response speed, however, we did not counterbalance the order of blocks. Thus, the processing 
changes from the first to the second block could also reflect a fatigue effect and should be 
interpreted with caution. 
 
For the a parameter, only the interaction of prediction condition and block yielded significance, 
F(2, 135) = 3.427, p = .035, , with all other Fs < 2.10, ps ⩾ .126. To further investigate 
this interaction, we computed block-difference scores (PM-intention present – PM-intention 
absent) for the a parameter in each condition. The one-way ANOVA with the between-subjects 
variable prediction condition (PM-prediction, PM/OT-prediction, No-prediction control) for the 
a-parameter difference scores was significant, F(2, 135) = 3.427, p = .035, . Next, we 
applied the same two planned-contrasts as for the RT analyses. The first contrast revealed that 
the a-parameter difference score was significantly higher in the PM-prediction condition (M = 
0.04, SE = .02) as compared to the control condition (M = −0.03, SE = .02) and the PM/OT-
prediction condition (M = −0.03, SE = .02), t(135) = 2.61, p = .010, d = .45. With good statistical 
power, the second contrast comparing the PM/OT and the control condition did not yield 
significance, |t| < 1. This pattern of results again implies that making exclusive PM predictions 
resulted in more cautious responding, likely reflecting an additional allocation of attention to the 
fulfillment of the intention. 
 
3.2.2. Reactive effects of making predictions on PM performance 
Proportions of correct PM responses (i.e., pressing the “/” key to PM-target words) were used to 
assess PM performance. Again, we applied a strict criterion of only counting immediate PM 
responses as accurate. Including late PM responses, however, would not have changed the 
present pattern of results. We did not find reactive effects of making PM predictions on PM 
performance, F < 1. Notably, PM performance assessment in Experiment 2 was based on four 
observations only, which might have negatively affected the reliability of this measure. At the 
same time, the fairly large sample-size should have counteracted caveats from reduced reliability 
of the PM performance measure. As in other studies with focal PM targets ( Einstein et al., 2005 
and Marsh et al., 2003), PM-performance was very high in all three conditions, even with only 
four occurrences of the PM target (see Table 2). Therefore, as argued earlier, the non-significant 
results might be due to the near ceiling PM performance. Most critically, that does not alter the 
important result that despite the easiness of the present focal PM task, individuals allocated 
additional attention to the fulfillment of the PM task after having made exclusive PM 
predictions. 
 
To investigate whether the variations in the OT response speed were functionally related to the 
PM-performance level, we correlated the proportion of correct PM responses with the RT-
difference scores separately for each condition. Scatter-plots are presented in Fig. 2. These 
analyses revealed no significant correlations in the control condition, r(46) = .16, p = .294, in the 
PM-prediction condition, r(46) = −.03, p = .865, or in the PM/OT-prediction condition, r(46) = 
.11, p = .463. This is in line with previous research showing that PM performance in the case of 
focal cues requires few attentional resources (Einstein et al., 2005). Thus, the prediction-induced 
slowing of OT performance was not functional for focal PM performance. 
 
Fig. 2.  
Scatter-plots reflect the relationship between PM-accuracy rates (ranging from 0 to 1) and 
response-time differences (RTs to words in the lexical-decision block where the intention was 
present minus RTs to words in the block where the intention was absent) (in ms) of Experiment 
2. Separate plots are provided for (A) the control conditions where no predictions were made, 
(B) the PM-prediction condition where the performance in the PM task was predicted only, and 
(C) the PM/OT-prediction condition where both performances in the PM task and in the ongoing 
task were predicted. 
3.2.3. Accuracy of PM predictions 
To evaluate the absolute accuracy of predictions we again subtracted the actual proportion of 
correct PM responses from the predicted proportion and compared these differences against 0 in 
one-sample t-tests, separately for the two prediction conditions. Participants in the PM-prediction 
condition (M = −.21, SE = .04), t(45) = −5.95, p < .001, and in the PM/OT-prediction condition 
(M = −.17, SE = .05), t(45) = −3.35, p = .002, expected their PM performance to be significantly 
lower than it actually was. As expected, the two groups did not differ in the magnitude of 
underestimation, |t| < 1. An underestimation of the actual PM performance is in line with most 
previous research on this topic ( Knight et al., 2005, Meeks et al., 2007 and Schnitzspahn et al., 
2011) but it is noteworthy that we found an overestimation of the actual PM performance in the 
nonfocal PM task in Experiment 1. We will discuss these findings further in Section 4. The 
correlation between PM performance and PM predictions again did not reach significance in the 
PM-prediction condition, r(46) = .11, p = .457, or in the PM/OT-prediction condition, r(46) = 
−.09, p = .561, suggesting that PM predictions were insensitive to relative performance level. 
 
4. General discussion 
In two experiments, we demonstrated that predicting one’s own performance in a PM task 
reactively changes PM processing. In Experiment 1, replicating previous findings from Meier et 
al. (2011), we found that nonfocal PM performance increased after making exclusive PM 
predictions as compared to a control condition without predictions. Importantly, these PM 
improvements were accompanied by slowed OT responding, which indicates that, after making 
exclusive PM predictions, participants allocated additional attention to the detection of the PM 
targets. These results are original evidence that making PM predictions reactively affects 
attentional PM processes as reflected by an objective processing measure. Furthermore, we 
showed that making OT predictions in addition to PM predictions counteracted such reactive 
effects of exclusive PM predictions, with attentional monitoring staying at the level of a no-
prediction control condition. Similarly, results of Experiment 2 demonstrated that attentional 
monitoring in a focal PM task was increased after making exclusive PM predictions. Again, 
when making PM predictions and additional OT predictions, attentional monitoring was 
equivalent to the level in a control condition without predictions. These results demonstrate that 
asking participants to predict their OT performance in addition to their PM performance prevents 
them from engaging in additional attentional PM processing over and above the level of attention 
devoted to the PM task when no predictions are made. 
 
In sum, the present findings provide direct evidence that making performance predictions 
influences the engagement in attentional PM processing. However, our results did not support 
Meier et al.’s (2011) assumption that asking participants to predict their own PM performance is 
an efficient strategy to improve (nonfocal) PM performance. Exclusive PM predictions were 
effective in as much as they resulted in a significant PM performance increase as compared to 
when no-predictions were made, at least, when late PM responses were not considered as 
accurate. However, while OT response speed was positively correlated with PM performance in 
our Experiment 1 with nonfocal cues when no predictions were made or when PM and OT 
predictions were made, making exclusive PM predictions rendered this correlation non-
significant. This correlational pattern suggests that the increase in attentional monitoring after 
exclusive PM predictions did not completely translate into PM performance improvements, 
suggesting that these attentional changes were a somewhat inefficient strategic response. 
Furthermore, when PM predictions and OT predictions were made, individuals achieved 
comparable PM performance as after exclusive PM predictions despite becoming significantly 
faster in their OT responding. Similarly, with the focal PM task in Experiment 2, the prediction-
induced slowing was unnecessary to achieve a high level of PM performance and OT 
performance. On the one hand, these findings are further evidence that small changes to the task 
procedure can affect attention-allocation policies. On the other hand, these findings suggest that 
one should carefully consider how much consideration is devoted to unfulfilled intentions, 
because exclusive rumination on unfulfilled intentions (or on their likelihood of being fulfilled) 
may come with a cost to other ongoing activities that is not completely functional for intention 
fulfillment. 
 
The finding of reactive effects of PM predictions also has general implications for investigating 
metamemory in the domain of PM. That is, the present demonstration that making PM 
predictions increases attentional monitoring for PM-target cues in both nonfocal and focal PM 
tasks highlights the importance of taking reactive effects of PM predictions into account when 
interpreting their accuracy. However, the present findings also suggest a simple (design-based) 
way of counteracting some of these reactive effects. When participants were not only asked to 
predict their PM performance but also to predict their OT performance, attentional monitoring 
was comparable to and nominally even lower than when no performance predictions were made. 
This finding indicates that the additional OT-prediction resulted in a de-allocation of attentional 
resources from the PM task as compared to the group that made PM predictions only. 
Alternatively, one could argue that predicting both the PM and the OT performance increased the 
overall level of attention devoted to the task setting consisting of the PM task and the OT.5 This 
alternative interpretation of the present results would imply that lexical-decision performance 
should have been more efficient in the PM/OT-prediction condition as compared to the PM-
prediction condition and the No-prediction control condition. We cannot completely rule out this 
alternative interpretation, but the additional drift–diffusion model analyses provide some 
contradictory evidence. Changes in the parameter a of the drift–diffusion model are associated 
with a more or less cautious responding in a lexical-decision task while changes in the parameter 
v are associated with variations in the processing efficiency ( Ratcliff et al., 2004 and 
Wagenmakers et al., 2008). In both Experiments 1 and 2, only parameter a but not parameter v 
varied with conditions, implying that participants in the PM/OT-prediction condition were not 
overly efficient in their processing as compared to the other groups. Therefore, results of the drift 
diffusion analyses are more in line with the interpretation that the exclusive PM prediction 
resulted in an allocation of attention from the OT to the PM task and that the additional OT 
prediction counteracted this attentional shift. 
 
Even after the readjustment of attentional monitoring via additional OT predictions, however, 
absolute PM predictions were rather inaccurate. In Experiment 2, participants underestimated 
their PM performance, independent of whether additional OT predictions were made or not. This 
is in line with most previous research on the accuracy of PM performance predictions (Knight et 
al., 2005, Meeks et al., 2007 and Schnitzspahn et al., 2011; but see also Devolder et al., 1990). In 
Experiment 1, PM predictions with and without additional OT predictions were also inaccurate, 
but participants significantly over-estimated their PM performance. Based on this findings, one 
could simply argue that PM predictions, just as some ever-day PM questionnaires (Uttl & 
Kibreab, 2011), are not overly valid, because they are not in line with the objective criterion (i.e., 
PM performance).6 However, in the present study, participants were ask to predict their 
performance in a task and then actually had to perform the task they made predictions for. Thus, 
PM predictions have a high face-validity. Nevertheless, criterion-validity was low, that is, PM 
predictions and actual PM performance data did not converge, and the question is why this was 
not the case. One could speculate that cultural differences play a role for the different estimation 
tendencies in Experiments 1 and 2, but the specific pattern of results indicate that these play a 
minor role at most.7 A more compelling explanation for these inconsistent findings might be 
that, especially in laboratory settings, individuals have no prior task experience to rely on in their 
PM predictions and thus they might anchor their predictions on information provided in the 
instructions (Rummel & Meiser, submitted for publication), follow general expectations about 
their own competence (cf. Hertzog & Hultsch, 2000), or follow a self-serving bias by expecting 
themselves to be above-average (cf. Chambers & Windschitl, 2004), as indicated by the middle-
point of the scale. If the objective difficulty of the PM task is then quite high and thus the PM 
performance rather low, as in our first experiment, these ill-calibrated performance-predictions 
are likely to result in an overestimation of the actual PM-performance. If the actual PM 
performance is quite high as in our second experiment, however, they are likely to result in an 
underestimation of the actual performance. 
 
While the present research suggests a design-based attenuation of reactive effects of PM 
predictions on attentional PM processes, future research is necessary to develop methods of 
better calibrating PM predictions. In line with findings that delayed retrospective memory 
predictions tend to be more accurate (Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991), Schnitzspahn et al. (2011) 
recently demonstrated that delayed PM predictions are more accurate than immediate ones, 
probably because individuals experience how likely they are to remember the intention. Future 
research should also consider that absolute predictions are likely to be contaminated by biases 
such as those described above. 
 
Despite the caveats for assessing expectancies about PM performance via performance 
predictions, we believe that PM predictions are a useful tool to better understand the cognitive 
strategies individuals engage to remember intentions. The finding that performance predictions 
reactively change the processing in a PM task is further evidence that metamemory can affect 
attention allocation strategies in PM (cf. Einstein & McDaniel, 2008). This finding also 
demonstrates, however, that such direct questioning can have some pitfalls, which researchers 
using PM predictions should take into account when interpreting their results. 
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Notes 
1 Meeks et al. (2007) examined two different kinds of PM-target conditions. That is, participants 
were asked to respond to members of the animal category or to the syllable “tor” with the PM 
key. Both making category inferences and engaging a perceptual search for a syllable should not 
rely on the same processes as making lexical decisions. Thus both kinds of PM-targets can be 
considered as nonfocal (cf. Einstein & McDaniel, 2005). 
2 As previous research has shown that a speed versus accuracy focus in the ongoing task affects 
monitoring processes (Meiser & Schult, 2008), we decided to ask participants to predict both the 
accuracy and the speed in the ongoing task to avoid inducing a reactive speed or accuracy bias. 
3 To rule out that the condition main effect was driven by a priori response-speed differences 
between experimental groups, we also analyzed the word RTs of the practice block. The 
ANOVA of prediction condition for practice-block RTs suggested that a priori response speed 
was comparable between the PM-prediction (M = 782; SE = 30), the PM/OT-prediction (M = 
771; SE = 30), and no-prediction control condition (M = 797; SE = 30), F < 1. 
4 When applying a more lenient criterion by counting both immediate PM responses as well as 
late PM responses (i.e., pressing the “/” key within the inter-stimulus interval after having 
pressed the “Yes” or “No” key in response to a PM target) as correct PM responses, we did not 
find evidence for reactive effects of making PM predictions on PM performance, F(2, 135) = 
1.61, p = .204, View the MathML source. This outcome suggests that allowing late PM 
responses can reduce the sensitivity to subtle manipulations of PM processing strategies (see also 
Boywitt & Rummel, 2012, Experiment 1). The data in Table 1 refers to the application of a strict 
criterion and, if not indicated otherwise, we will apply the strict criterion for the following 
analyses. 
5 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this possibility. 
6 We thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing up this issue. 
7 The German participants of our Experiment 2 tended to underestimate their PM performance 
just as the American participants in the study from Meeks et al. (2007). Additionally, we also 
found an underestimation of PM performance in a focal task in a sample of American (UNCG) 
students in another unpublished experiment. The UNCG students of our Experiment 1, on the 
other hand, tended to overestimate their performance in a PM task, which was largely 
comparable to the one Meeks et al. reported an underestimation with. The other studies on PM 
predictions, which included samples from Germany, Switzerland, New Zealand, and the US did 
not show a consistent pattern of culture-dependent PM over- and under-estimation. 
